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There  is  currently  much  interest  in  predicting  the 
rate  of  inflation  for  1976.  In  recent  years  a  number 
of  ad  hoc  explanations  of  inflation  have  attributed 
price  rises  to special  factors  prevailing  in the  economy 
at  the  time.  According  to  this  approach,  inflation  is a 
process  whereby  the  price  effects  of  special  factors  in 
one  sector  of  the  economy  are  pushed  along  to  other 
sectors  and  spread  throughout  the  economy  to  affect 
the  general  price  level.  As  an  alternative,  the  mone- 
tarist  view  sees  inflation  as  strictly  a  monetary  phe- 
nomenon-excessive  increases  in  the  money  supply 
induce  individuals  to  increase  their  spending  in  an 
attempt  to  restore  their  real  money  balances  to  the 
desired  level.  In  the  aggregate,  this  increased  spend- 
ing  forces  the  general  price  level  upward.  The  pur- 
pose  of  this  article  is  to  explain  the  monetarist  view 
of  inflation,  to  use  this  view  to  evaluate  the  need  for 
special  factors  arguments  to  explain  recent  inflation, 
and  to  evaluate  the  outlook  for  prices  in  1976. 
Although  special  factors  explanations  of  inflation 
have  existed  for  many  years,  such  theories  have  been 
given  much  attention  in discussions  of spiraling  prices 
since  1973.i  Chart  1 displays  the  percentage  contri- 
bution  of  the  major  components  of  the  Consumer 
Price  Index  (CPI)  to  the  total  increase  in  the  CPI. 
Such  a  chart  is often  used  as  the  starting  point  for  a 
special  factors  explanation  of  inflati0n.a  Chart  1 
shows  that  in  1973  food  and  energy  prices  accounted 
for  62.8  percent  of  the  increase  in the  CPI.  The  rise 
in  food  and  energy  prices,  and  by  inference  a  major 
part  of  the  rise  in  the  CPI,  is  then  commonly  ac- 
counted  for  by  two  special  factors  : the  devaluation  of 
the  dollar  and  international  commodity  inflation.  The 
first  factor,  the  devaluation  of  the  dollar,  is  con- 
sidered  inflationary  for  two  reasons.  The  price  of 
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imported  items  such  as  oil  is raised  directly,  and  the 
price  of  exported  items  such  as  grain  is  raised  in- 
directly  via  increases  in  foreign  demand  for  our  ex- 
ports.  The  second  factor,  the  international  commodity 
inflation,  involves  rising  prices  of  internationally- 
traded  goods  such  as  oil  and  grain.  Underlying  this 
phenomenon  are  high  levels  of  world  output,  poor 
weather  and  the  resulting  below-average  harvests, 
and  the  OPEC  oil cartel.  In  addition,  special  factors 
theories  of  inflation  often  attribute  inflation  to  a 
variety  of  other  causes  such  as  the  extent  of  unused 
industrial  capacity,  the  unemployment  rate,  the 
growth  of  wages,  increases  in  monopoly  power,  etc. 
Using  a  special  factors  approach,  if  one  wants  to 
predict  the  growth  in  the  CPI  he  would  analyze 
conditions  in  various  sectors  of  the  economy  and 
aggregate  all  these  forces  into  an  overall  inflationary 
impact.  For  example,  a  study  of  crop  forecasts  and 
anticipated  demand  would  reveal  the  outlook  for  food 
prices,  a  study  of  the  oil  sector  would  reveal  the 
outlook  for  fuel  prices,  etc. 
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an  alternative  point  of  view  regarding  the  cause  of 
inflation.  This  view  defines  inflation  as  the  change 
in  the  rate  of  exchange,  or  terms  of  trade,  between 
dollars  and  the  aggregate  basket  of goods  and  services 
produced.  Inflation  means  that  a  dollar  depreciates 
when  measured  in terms  of the  goods  and  services  for 
which  it  will  exchange.  What  is  of  economic  signifi- 
cance  to  individuals  is  not  simply  the  number  of 
dollars  they  hold  (their  nominal  cash  balances)  but 
rather  the  purchasing  power  of  these  dollars  mea- 
sured  in  terms  of  the  aggregate  basket  of  goods  and 
services  (their  real  cash  balances).  Real  cash  bal- 
ances  depend  on  the  number  of  dollars  individuals 
hold  and  the  rate  of  exchange  between  dollars  and 
the  aggregate  basket  of goods  and  services.  Assuming 
the  total  number  of  dollars  all  individuals  hold  is 
determined  by  the  government,  the  only  way  individ- 
uals  taken  collectively  have  of  adjusting  to  a situation 
in  which  their  actual  holdings  of  real  cash  balances 
are  greater  than  their  desired  holdings  of  real  cash 
balances  is  by  a  depreciation  in  terms  of  dollars  in 
this  rate  of  exchange,  that  is  by  inflation. 
A  single  individual  will  attempt  to  adjust  to  such  a 
discrepancy  by  reducing  the  nominal  amount  of  his 
cash  balances,  that  is by  increasing  his  spending  rate  ; 
however,  one  person’s  reduction  in  nominal  cash  bal- 
ances  is  another  person’s  addition,  since  the  total 
amount  of  dollars  is  fixed  for  the  aggregate  of  indi- 
viduals.  The  result  is to  increase  aggregate  spending 
on  the  basket  of  goods  and  services.  The  increase  in 
spending  in  turn  causes  a  general  rise  in  the  price 
level  as  producers  of  goods  and  services  raise  prices 
when  they  find  that  demand  for  their  products  ex- 
ceeds  supply.  This  rise  in  the  price  level  reduces 
actual  aggregate  real  cash  balances  (the  real  pur- 
chasing  power  of  the  nominal  money  stock)  to  the 
desired  level.  Equilibrium  is  restored  by  a  depreci- 
ation  of  the  dollar  against  the  basket  of  goods  and 
services. 
Why,  then,  do  actual  holdings  of  real  cash  bal- 
ances  in  the  aggregate  exceed  the  amount  that  people 
desire  to  hold  ?  To  explain  this  phenomenon,  the 
monetarists  employ  the  empirical  generalization  that 
changes  in  desired  real  cash  balances  occur  only 
gradually  or  as  a  result  of  the  consequences  of  an 
earlier  change  in  money  balances  from  the  supply 
side.  For  example,  estimates  by  individuals  of  their 
long-term  income  are  assumed  to  be  a  significant 
determinant  of  their  demand  for  real  cash  balances, 
but  factors  highly  variable  in  the  short  run,  such  as 
money  market  interest  rates,  are  not  assumed  to  be 
significant  determinants.  The  implication  then  is that 
large  fluctuations  from  one  year  to  the  next  in  the 
rate  of  inflation  derive  from  the  supply  side.  They 
derive  from  large  fluctuations  in  the  supply  of  nom- 
inal  money. 
Some  Theoretical  Considerations  A  critical  ques- 
tion  separating  those  who  rely  on  special  factors 
explanations  of  inflation  and  those  who  do  not  is 
whether  an  increase  in a particular  price  can  lead  to  a 
rise  in  the  general  price  level. 
While  recognizing  that  in  the short run  an  increase 
in  the  relative  price  of  a  key  input  such  as  oil  could 
lead  to  a  temporary  increase  in  the  general  price 
level,  critics  of  special  factors  explanations  of  infla- 
tion  see  an  equilibrating  mechanism  at  work  in  tlie 
long  run.  They  argue  that  individuals,  because  of 
their  wealth,  the  amount  of  uncertainty  in  the  world, 
etc.  want  to  hold  in  the  aggregate  a  given  amount  of 
money  measured  in  terms  of  its  purchasing  power. 
A  price  rise  for  a  particular  commodity  will  cause 
actual  real  cash  balances  to  be  less  than  desired  real 
cash  balances  as  the  weighted  average  of  all  prices 
rises  initially.  Individuals  will  then  hold  less  money 
in  real  terms  than  they  desire  and  will  reduce  their 
expenditures  until  prices  of  other  goods  subsequently 
fall  enough  to  offset  the  original  rise  in the  price  level, 
and  equality  is  restored  between  actual  and  desired 
real  cash  balances.3 
The  special  factors  and  monetarist  explanations  of 
inflation  also  imply  a  different  impact  on  prices  of an 
increase  in  exports.  Some  proponents  of  special 
factors  theories  of  inflation  argue  that,  in  general, 
high  levels  of  grain  exports  are  inflationary.  In- 
creased  exports  entail  reduced  amounts  of  grain 
available  domestically,  higher  grain  prices,  and  a 
higher  average  price  level.  However,  unless  grain 
exports  are  subsidized  by  the  government,  grain  is 
exported  by  sellers  who  do  so  only  because  they  are 
able  to  exchange  it  for  goods  that  have  more  value  to 
them  than  the  grain.  Exchanging  grain  exports  for 
more  highly  valued  imports  makes  people  as  a  whole 
wealthier;  therefore,  they  desire  to  hold  greater  real 
cash  balances.  For  a  given  nominal  quantity  of 
money  the  price  level  must  fall,  and  grain  exports  are 
deflationary,  not  inflationary.  As  a matter  of  general 
theory,  therefore,  it  is  invalid  to  link  domestic  infla- 
tion  causally  with  increased  exports. 
“A  slightly  more  sophisticated  theory  wherein  changes  in  relative 
prices  lead  to  a  general  price  rise  involves  the  assumption  of  an 
accommodative  monetary  policy.  If  in  the  adjustment  to  changes 
in  relative  prices  unemployment  is  created,  a  central  bank  com- 
mitted  to  a  policy  of  full  employment  would  be  induced  to  expand 
the  money  supply  at  a  faster  pace.  In  this  case  a  change  in  an 
individual  price  leads  to  a  general  prioc  rise  via  accommodative 
monetary  policy. 
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rate  of  growth  of  money  increases,  individuals  find 
that  their  real  cash  balances  exceed  the  desired  level  ; 
however,  it  takes  time  for  them  to  realize  that  the 
increase  is  permanent  and  not  a  temporary  fluctu- 
ation.  Individuals  then  try  to  reduce  their  cash  bal- 
ances  by  spending  more.  Producers  at  first  reduce 
their  inventories  rather  than  raise  prices,  since  they 
do  not  know  if  the  increased  demand  is  permanent 
or  only  temporary.  Given  the  persistence  of  in- 
creased  demand,  employers  try  to  increase  produc- 
tion.  As  the  demand  for  productive  resources  in- 
creases,  the  prices  of  these  resources  increase.  Labor 
will  work  longer  hours  only  if  their  wage  rates  are 
increased,  for  example.  Employers  then  raise  prices 
in  response  to  increased  costs,  and  finally  the  CPI 
rises.  The  whole  process  is  lengthened  by  the  exis- 
tence  of contracts  in nominal  terms,  both  explicit  and 
implicit,  which  are  renegotiated  only  infrequently. 
Incidentally,  the  time  sequence  of  the  above  series  of 
events  explains  the  popular  appeal  of  cost-  or  wage- 
push  theories  of inflation.  Employers  appear  to  raise 
prices,  and  cause  inflation,  in  response  to  rising 
wages  and  other  costs. 
Money  Growth  and  Prices  How  well  has  mone- 
tary  growth  explained  inflation  recently  in the  United 
States?  Chart  2 shows  the  percentage  rate  of  change 
of  the  consumer  price  index  and  of the  money  supply 
lagged  21  months.  Changes  for  both  series  are  on 
an  annual  basis,  and  money  is the  sum  of  currency  in 
circulation  and  demand  deposits  (Mi).  The  series 
are  smoothed  by  usin,  m successive  percentage  changes 
between  the  value  for  the  current  month  and  the 
value  for  six  months  previous.4 
In  order  to  determine  the  number  of  months  to  lag 
money  (Ml)  in  Chart  2,  the  percentage  changes  in 
the  CPI  and  Mr  were  correlated  for  the  period  from 
January  1955  to  August  1971,  with  the  latter  lagged 
at  values  ranging  from  12 to  30  months.  The  lag  of 
21  months  was  chosen  as  the  correlations  rose  and 
then  fell  as  the  lag  progressed  from  12  to  30  with 
21  as  the  peak  value. 
Percentage  changes  in  M1  have  a  higher  trend 
value  than  those  in  the  CPI.  From  1952  to  1970 the 
average  annual  rate  of  change  in  the  CPI  was  2.1 
percent.  Keeping  the  Zl-month  lag  of  Chart  2  for 
the  period  that  corresponds  to  1952  to  1970,  the 
average  annual  rate  of change  in Mr  was  2.8  percent. 
The  trend  value  for  M1 is then  0.7  percentage  points 
above  the  CPI  for  this  period.  The  CPI  is  also  a 
more  stable  series  than  the  Mr  series. 
The  behavior  of  the  money  supply  affects  the  be- 
havior  of prices  over  a period  of many  years  and  with 
a  variable  lag,  so  that  the  CPI  and  Ml  as  shown  in 
Chart  2 are  not  expected  to  move  together  ; neverthe- 
less,  from  June  1962  to  August  1971  their  move- 
ments  are  similar.  There  is  one  significant  drop  in 
the  money  series  that  does  not  correspond  to  a  fall 
in  the  CPI.  This  decline  reaches  a  trough  in  July 
1968  and  reflects  the  lowering  of  the  rate  of  growth 
* For  the  CPI  we  use  2  x  [ln  CPI(O)  -  In  CPlt-6)  1  where  In  is 
the  natural  logarithm  and  the  values  in  parentheses.  the  0  and  -6. 
refer  to  the  values  of  the  CPI  that  occurred  in  the  current  month 
and  six  months  earlier.  The  factor  2  converts  the  percentage 
change  to  an  annual  basis.  The  values  for  MI  are  calculated 
similarly,  then  lagged  by  21  months. 
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centage  changes  of  the  CPI,  however,  does  diminish 
in  this  period. 
Recent  Experience  Proponents  of  special  factors 
theories  of  inflation  argue  that  the  rate  of  change  in 
the  CPI  that  began  in  1973  cannot  be  explained 
satisfactorily  as  a monetary  phenomenon.  How  well 
does  the  money  stock  series  predict  the  price  series, 
particularly  the  rise  in  the  CPI  beginning  in  the 
spring  of  1973?  In  examining  this  question,  it  is 
useful  to  refer  to  the  two  consecutive  ZO-month 
periods  starting  in August  19T1, the  date  when  wage 
and  price  controls  were  instituted.  These  two  periods 
are  marked  by  downward-pointing  arrows  in  Chart  2. 
As  illustrated  in  the  chart,  there  is  a  ZO-month 
period  from  August  1971  to  April  1973  when  the 
rate  of  change  of  the  CPI  is  lower  than  would  be 
predicted  given  the  underIying  pressure  on  prices 
represented  by  lagged  rates  of  change  of  the  money 
supply.5  The  rate  of  change  of  the  CPI  for  this 
period  is 3.7 percent  ; the  rate  of change  of  M1 lagged 
21  months  is  6.0  percent.6  (The  percentages  are  on 
an  annual  basis.)  As  the  trend  rate  of  growth  of 
lagged  M1  exceeds  that  of  the  CPI  by  0.7  percent 
for  the  period  1952 to  1970,  a simple.way  of  predict- 
ing  the  rate  of  growth  of  the  CPI  is  to  take  the  rate 
of  growth  of  M1  lagged  21  months  and  subtract  0.7 
percent  from  it.  For  the  ZO-month  period  from 
August  1971  to  April  1973  the  actual  rate  of  growth 
of  the  CPI  then  fell  short  of  the  predicted  rate  of 
growth  by  1.6 percentage  points,  i.e., 
3.7  -  (6.0  -  0.7)  =  -1.6. 
This  result  suggests  that  initially  the  wage  and 
price  controls  did  succeed  in  making  the  CPI  rise 
more  slowly  than  it  would  have  risen  in  the  absence 
of  controls.  Contracts  in  nominal  terms  contain  im- 
plicit  assumptions  about  future  rates  of  inflation,  and 
a  lowering  of  inflationary  expectations  will  tempo- 
rarily  cause  the  prices  negotiated  in  contracts  to  be 
lower  than  otherwise.  Also,  47.7  percent  of the  items 
in  the  CPI  were  covered  by  controls  in  Phase  II 
(November  14,  1971,  to  January  11,  1973).  The 
prices  of  these  items  must  have  risen  more  slowly 
than  in  the  absence  of  controls.  Finally,  the  price 
behavior  in the  uncontrolled  sector  is not  independent 
of  price  behavior  in  the  controlled  sector.  As  an 
5The  period  actually  includes  21  months.  The  reference  to  20 
months  refers  to  the  number  of  monthly  percentage  changes  in 
this  period. 
6The  calculations  use  a  six-month  average  of  the  CPI  ending  in 
August  1971 for  the  initial observation  and  ending  in  April  1973  for 
the  final  observation.  Ml  is  calculated  similarly  except  that  the 
values  precede  those  of  the  CPI  by  21  months. 
illustration,  consider  a  statement  from  a  representa- 
tive  of  the  grocery  industry  made  in  hearings  before 
Congress  on  whether  to  extend  controls  after  their 
scheduled  expiration  date,  April  1974 : 
. . . in  Phase  II,  the Price  Commission was  able to 
control  prices  effectively  for  bread  and other baked 
goods  by  limiting  the  prices  of  the  three  largest 
firms  in the industry.  These firms  were  precluded 
from  implementing  any  cost  justified  price  in- 
creases  because  their  profit  margins  would  have 
exceeded the  level  of their  margins  during  an  arbi- 
trarily  selected base period.  Smaller bakers, on the 
other  hand,  with  reduced  profits,  when  not  con- 
strained  by  the profit  margin  test,  were  permitted 
to pass  on their  increased  costs under  price  control 
regulations.  They  were, however,  in reality,  simply 
unable  to  raise  their  prices  to  recover  increased 
costs  because  if  they  did  their  products  would  be 
more costly  to consumers than the controlled  larger 
firms,  and  they  would  have  been  chased  off 
the  grocery  store  shelves.  As  a  result,  many 
smaller  bakers  have  been  subjected  to  severe  and 
critical  financial  hardships,  resulting  in  numerous 
closings.7 
The  above  quotation  suggests  that  controls  on 
prices  in  one  part  of  the  economy  may  retard  price 
rises  in  the  exempted  part  of  the  economy,  but  only 
temporarily.  In  the  case  referred  to  above,  some 
firms  in  the  exempted  sector  were  driven  out  of 
business.  More  generally,  however,  prices  must  be 
driven  up  in  the  exempted  sector  by  enough  more 
than  they  wouId  have  been  in  the  absence  of  controls, 
to  cause  the  average  price  IeveI  for  the  entire  output. 
of  the  economy,  exempt  and  nonexempt,  to  reduce 
real  cash  balances  to  the  level  desired  by  individuals. 
This  reasoning  suggests  that  over  the  long  run  price 
controls  could  not  have  been  expected  to  slow  the 
rate  of  inflation,  Furthermore,  it  suggests  that  a 
period  when  the  growth  rate  of  the  CPI  has  been 
reduced  by  the  imposition  of  price  controls  wilI  be 
followed  by  a  period  of  more  rapid  than  normal 
growth  in  the  CPI.  If  this  compensatory  rise  in  the 
CPI  plus  lagged  rates  of  growth  of  money  account 
for  the  bulge  in  prices  in  1973  and  1974,  then  onle 
can  explain  inflation  even  in  recent  times  in  terms  o’f 
monetary  phenomena,  and  there  is  no  need  for  re:- 
course  in  the  explanation  to  special  factors. 
For  the  ZO-month  period  starting  April  1973  and 
ending  December  1974, the  rate  of growth  in the  CPI 
is  10.6  percent.  The  corresponding  rate  of  growth 
of  lagged  M1  for  this  period  is  6.8  percent.8  Was 
the  excess  of  price  growth  over  lagged  M1  growth 
5 U.  S.,  Congress,  Senate,  Committee  on  Banking,  Housing  and 
Urban  Affairs,  Oversight  on  Economic  Stabilization.  Rearinys, 
George  W.  Koch,  statement.  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Production 
and  Stabilization  of  the  Senate  Banking,  Housing  and  Urban  Affairs 
Committee,  p.  390. 
SThe  computation  is  performed  as  before  with  the  base  observation 
being  the  previous  final  observation  and  the  new  final  observaticon 
being  the  six-month  average  ending  December  1974.  Again,  the 
percentages  are  on  an  annual  basis.  and  the  percentage  change  in 
MI  referred  to  below  is  esIeulsted  similarly  using  values  21  mont.hs 
earlier. 
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planation  of  inflation  ? 
One  method  of  predicting  the  expected  rate  of 
price  rise  is  to  adjust  the  growth  rate  of  lagged  %I1 
for  (1)  the  difference  in  trend  rates  of  growth  be- 
tween  M1  and  the  CPI  and  (2)  the  shortfall  of  the 
actual  rise  in  the  CPI  from  the  predicted  rise  in  the 
CPI  in  the  period  of  price  controls.  The  difference 
in  trend  growth  rates  of  Ml  and  CPI  is 0.7  percent. 
The  shortfall  of  the  actual  from  the  predicted  rise  in 
the  CPI  in  the  preceding  period,  as  calculated  above. 
was  1.6  percent.  Adding  these  to  the  6%  percent 
lagged  M1 growth  rate  (6.S  -  0.7  +  1.6))  the  pre- 
dicted  growth  rate  for  the  CPI  in  the  period  from 
April  1973  to  December  1974  is  7.7  percent.  -4s 
the  actual  rate  of growth  in the  CPI  was  10.6 percent, 
the  actual  value  was  greater  than  the  predicted  value 
by  2.9  percentage  points.  -4s  a  percentage  of  the 
actual  rate  of  inflation,  the  prediction  error  is  27 
percent. 
The  question  now  becomes  (1)  whether  an  error 
of  this  magnitude  is  large  enough  to  justify  looking 
for  a  special  factors  explanation  as  opposed  to  a 
monetarist  explanation  of  inflation  on  the  grounds 
that  new  forces  are  present  or  (2)  whether  given  the 
length  and  variability  of  the  lags  involved  an  error 
of this  magnitude  is what  could  be expected  from  past 
experience.  This  question  might  be  approached  by 
calculating  discrepancies  between  actual  and  pre- 
dicted  rates  of  inflation  as  a  percentage  of  the  actual 
rate  of  inflation  for  the  three  preceding  20-month 
periods  and  comparin, (+ those  errors  with  the  above 
error.  -4gain  predicting  the  rate  of  growth  of  the 
CPI  using  lagged,  trend  adjusted  growth  in  MLI1, 
these  errors  are  calculated  to  be  -25,  30,  and  -10 
percent  for  the  periods  August  1966  to  April  196S1 
April  1968 to  December  1969, and  December  1969 to 
August  1971,  respectively.  The  errors  are  compar- 
able  to  the  error  for  the  1973-1974  period. 
Furthermore,  there  have  been  periods  in  the  past 
when  the  rate  of  growth  of  the  CPI  has  significantly 
exceeded  that  of  the  lagged  money  supply.  Chart  3 
is for  the  period  January  1950 to  December  1956 and 
is calculated  in  exactly  the  same  way  as  Chart  2,  es- 
cept  that  the  311 series  is  lowered  by  0.7  percent  so 
that  it  may  be  used  to  predict  the  CPI  series  directly 
without  adjusting  for  differing  trends.  As  shown  in 
Chart  3,  during  the  Korean  War  period  prices  rose 
significantly  faster  than  would  be  indicated  1)).  lagged 
rates  of  growth  of  M1.  Intli~idu;&  espectetl  a  re- 
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currence  of  the  inflation  of  World  War  II  and  an 
erosion  in  the  value  of  their  cash  balances.  There 
was,  therefore,  :i  decrease  in  the  demand  for  real 
cash  balances,  an  increase  in  aggregate  spending,  and 
a  rise  in  the  price  level.  It  is  interesting  to  note 
that  while  the  actual  rate  of  growth  of  the  CPI  was 
greater  than  the  predicted  growth  during  the  Korean 
War  for  the  reasons  just  mentioned,  this  discrepancy 
was  offset  in  the  period  following  the  War  by  a  rate 
of  growth  of the  CPI  below  the  predicted  growth. 
For  the  period  of the  price  bulge  in  1973 and  1974, 
the  actual  exceeded  the  predicted  rate  of  growth  of 
the  CPI  by  2.9  percentage  points.  There  have  been 
periods  other  than  wartime  when  errors  of  similar 
magnitude  occurred.  For  the  20-month  period  Janu- 
ary  1957  to  September  195S,  making  predictions  as 
before,  the  actual  rate  of  growth  of  the  CPI  was  2.4 
percentage  points  above  the  predicted  rate.  It  is 
interesting  to  note  that  special  factors  theories  of 
inflation,  in  parscular  cost-push  inflation  caused  by 
unions,  were  especially  popular  during  this  period. 
Some  final  general  observations  are  useful.  There 
are  reasons  for  especting  that  the  actual  would  ex- 
ceed  the  predicted  changes  in  the  CPI  for  the  1973- 
1974  period  even  after  adjusting  for  the  retardation 
in  the  growth  oi  the  CPI  caused  by  the  initial  im- 
position  of  wage  and  price  controls  in  the  earlier 
period.  Before  -+x-i1  1974,  the  date  wage  and  price 
controls  expired.  l~lsinessmen  thought  that  controls 
nlight  I)e estendrd.  After  April  1974,  businessmen 
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able  price  increases  under  controls  depend  on  base 
prices,  businessmen  probably  kept  prices  up  instead 
of  lowering  them  or  raised  them  more  than  they 
might  have  ordinarily  as  a way  of  not  getting  caught 
with  a low  base  price.  Second,  the  real  cash  balances 
people  desire  to  hold  depend  on  the  cost  of  holding 
the  balances.  Inflation  is  a  cost  or  tax  on  these  bal- 
ances,  since  in  order  to  maintain  real  balances  at  a 
given  level  the  individual  must  add  to  his  nominal 
cash  balances  every  year  to  compensate  for  their 
depreciation  in  value.  In  response  to  the  increase  in 
the  rate  of  inflation  starting  in  the  last  half  of  1972, 
caused  by  previous  high  rates  of  growth  in  M1, 
people  may  have  tried  to  reduce  their  real  cash  bal- 
antes  relative  to  previous  holdings.  Such  an  attempt 
would  cause  an  overshooting  in  prices  for  a  while,  or 
put  otherwise,  for  a  while  lagged  money  stock  data 
would  temporarily  under-predict  prices.  Finally,  a 
monetarist  explanation  of  inflation  suggests  that  the 
rapid  price  rises  of  1973 and  1974 were  unsustainable. 
Over  a  long  period  of  time,  the  rate  of  rise  of  prices 
must  be in  line  with  the  rate  of  growth  of  the  money 
supply.  The  period  considered  ends  December  1974. 
A  decrease  in  the  rate  of  change  of  the  CPI  after 
that  date  is  shown  in  Chart  2. 
The  forecasts  presented  in  the following  section 
aye those of the author and  in  no way represent 
the views of  the Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Rich- 
mond. 
Predicting  Price  Movements  This  type  of  analy- 
sis  does  not  disprove  special  factors  explanations  of 
inflation  or  show  the  superiority  of  monetary  the- 
ories  of  inflation.  It  does  suggest,  however,  that  in 
the  recent  past  it  has  been  reasonable  to  use  lagged 
rates  of  growth  of  money  to  predict  prices  and  that 
the  last  few  years  do  not  represent  a  departure  from 
past  experience  in  this  respect. 
Table  I 
PREDICTED  RATES  OF  CHANGE  IN  THE  CPI 
April  1976  6.2 
May  1976  4.6 
June  1976  3.3 
July  1976 
August  1976  3.6 
Average  4.1 
Table  I  shows  rates  of  change  in  the  CPI  for  next 
year  that  are  predicted  using  the  very  simple  tech-, 
nique  of  extrapolating  from  past  rates  of  growth  of 
the  money  stock  suggested  above.  The  figures  are: 
rates  of  change  of  the  CPI  on  an  annual  basis  for 
the  six-month  period  ending  with  the  date  shown. 
They  are  the  actual  annualized  percentage  rates  of 
change  of  M1 for  the  corresponding  six-month  period 
21  months  earlier  minus  0.7  percent.  The  figures 
may  be  read  off  Chart  2  by  lowering  the  M1  series 
0.7  percent.  As  the  M1  series  is  more  erratic  than 
the  CPI  series,  probably  the  average  figure  of  4.l 
percent  is  a  better  predictor  of  price  behavior  thi:s 
year. 
This  article  has  developed  the  monetarist  explana- 
tion  of  inflation.  It  has  also  presented  a  simplle 
method  of forecasting  inflation  based  on  the  observed 
lags  between  rates  of  change  of  money  and  prices. 
The  lags,  as  shown,  are  not  only  long  but  also  vari- 
able.  The  actual  rate  of  inflation  may  be  significantly 
above  or  below  4.1  percent  in  1976.  If  the  over- 
shooting  effect  described  above  did  occur  in  197% 
1974,  its  actual  rate  of  growth  may  be  lower  as  the 
reverse  process  occurs  this  year.  In  any  case,  this 
monetarist  forecast  may  be  compared  with  those 
using  different  frameworks  as  the  events  unfold  over 
the  coming  months. 
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